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Abstract: Faults in automated processes will often cause undesired reactions and
shut-down of a controlled plant, and the consequences could be damage to the plant,
to personnel or the environment. Fault-tolerant control is the synonym for a set of
recent techniques that were developed to increase plant availability and reduce the
risk of safety hazards. Its aim is to prevent that simple faults develop into serious
failure. Fault-tolerant control merges several disciplines to achieve this goal, including
on-line fault diagnosis, automatic condition assessment and calculation of remedial
actions when a fault is detected. The envelope of the possible remedial actions is wide.
This paper introduces tools to analyze and explore structure and other fundamental
properties of an automated system such that any redundancy in the process can be
fully utilized to enhance safety and availability.
Keywords: fault-tolerant control, fault accommodation, reconguration, fault
diagnosis
1. INTRODUCTION
Automated systems are vulnerable to faults. De-
fects in sensors, actuators, in the process itself,
or within the controller, can be amplied by the
closed-loop control systems, and faults can de-
velop into malfunction of the loop. The closed-
loop may alternatively hide a fault from being
observed until a situation is reached in which
a failure is inevitable. Alternatively, the closed-
loop control action may hide a fault from being
observed. A situation is reached in which a fault
eventually develops into a state where loop-failure
is inevitable. A control-loop failure will easily
cause production to stop or system malfunction
at a plant level.
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With economic demand for high plant availabil-
ity, and an increasing awareness about the risks
associated with system malfunction, dependabil-
ity is becoming an essential concern in industrial
automation. A cost-eective way to obtain in-
creased dependability in automated systems is to
introduce fault-tolerant control (FTC). This is an
emerging area in automatic control where several
disciplines and system-theoretic issues are com-
bined to obtain a unique functionality. A key issue
is that local faults are prevented from developing
into failures that can stop production or cause
safety hazards.
Automation for safety-critical applications, where
no failure could be tolerated, requires redun-
dant hardware to facilitate fault recovery. Fail-
operational systems are made insensitive to any
single point component failure. Fail-safe systems
make controlled shut-down to a safe state when
a sensor measurement indicates a critical fault.
In contrast, fault-tolerant control systems, em-
ploy redundancy in the plant and its automa-
tion system to make "intelligent" software that
monitors behavior of components and function
blocks. Faults are isolated, and appropriate reme-
dial actions taken to prevent that faults develop
into critical failures. The overall FTC strategy
is to keep plant availability and accept reduced
performance when critical faults occur.
One way of achieving fault-tolerance is to employ
fault diagnosis schemes on-line. A discrete event
signal to a supervisor-agent is generated when a
fault is detected. This, in turn activates accom-
modation actions (Blanke et al., 1997), which can
be pre-determined for each type of critical fault
or obtained from real-time analysis and optimiza-
tion.
Systematic analysis of fault propagation (Blanke,
1996), (Bgh, 1997) was shown to be a good
starting point for FTC system design. A semantics
for services based on generic component models
was developed in (Staroswiecki and Bayart, 1996),
(Gehin and Staroswiecki, 1999) and a graphic
analysis was found to be very useful. The proper-
ties of combined fault diagnosis and control were
treated in (Patton, 1997). (Stoustrup and Grim-
ble, 1997) focus on the use of fault estimation
within a reliable control framework, using deni-
tions in (Veillette et al., 1992). Real application
of FTC is also reported. Predetermined design
for accommodation was demonstrated for a small
satellite in (Bgh et al., 1995), and (Bgh, 1997).
Techniques using logic inference on qualitative
models were used in (Lunze, 1994) and (Lunze
and Schiller, 1992).
A related area is the control of discrete-event
dynamical systems (DEDS) which have a known
structure with pre-determined events that occur
with unknown instants and sequence (Wonham,
1988). Diagnosis for DEDS was treated in (Sampath
et al., 1996) and (Lunze and Schroder, 1999).
DEDS is a sub-class of FTC, where events are not
pre-determined and system structure can change
when faults occur.
Concerning implementation, a correct and consis-
tent control system analysis should always be fol-
lowed by equally correct software implementation.
This is particularly relevant for the supervisory
parts of an FTC scheme (Izadi-Zamanabadi, 1999)
since testing of FTC elements is particularly dif-
cult. Software architecture is thus also an issues
in FTC context. A study of the use of object-
oriented programming architectures was described
by (Lunau, 1997). The FTC area is very wide
and involves several areas of system theory. One
overview (Patton, 1997) emphasized many algo-
rithmic essentials and the role of FDI. Another
(Blanke et al., 1997) presented an engineering
view of the means to obtain FTC.
This paper focus on the methodological issues
in analysis for FTC. The severity of faults is
rst addressed through analysis of fault propaga-
tion, which provides a list of faults that should
be stopped from developing into failure due to
the severity of their end eects. The possibili-
ties to detect and stop propagation of particular
faults are then dealt with. A structural analysis
technique is introduced, which uses graph the-
ory to determine which redundancy exist in the
system and thus shows the possibilities to di-
agnose and handle particular faults (Gehin and
Staroswiecki, 1999), (Staroswiecki et al., 1999),
(Izadi-Zamanabadi, 1999). The structure of the
problem gives a number of possibilities for recov-
ery. The ability to control or observe the system
(Lin, 1974), (Willems, 1986) are extended to mea-
sure these properties of a system after a particular
fault (Frei et al., 1999), (Wu and Zhou, 2000).
Next, implementation of a fault-tolerant control
scheme is proposed as a layered structure where
an autonomous supervisor implements detection
and reconguration using the necessary logics.
The overall development strategy is nally sum-
marized and an example illustrate features of the
methods.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS
As this is a new engineering eld terminology it
is particularly important to dene the terminol-
ogy carefully. A short list is enclosed with the
main terms. A longer list can be found in the
IFAC - SAFEPROCESS terminology denition
(Isermann and Balle, 1997). In addition to termi-
nology, dierent control methods should be clearly
distinguished. Denitions are included to specify
explicitly what should be understood by the term
fault-tolerant control.
2.1 Terminology
 Constraint a functional relation between
variables and parameters of a system. Con-
straints may be specied in dierent forms,
including linear and nonlinear dierential
equations, and tabular relations with logic
conditions between variables.
 Fail-operational : a system is able to operate
with no change in objectives or performance
despite of any single failure.
 Fail-safe: a system fails to a state that is
considered safe in the particular context.
 Fault-tolerance: the ability of a controlled
system to maintain control objectives, de-
spite the occurrence of a fault. A degrada-
tion of control performance may be accepted.
Fault-tolerance can be obtained through
fault accommodation or through system and
/or controller reconguration.
 Fault-accommodation: change in controller
parameters or structure to avoid the conse-
quences of a fault. The input-output between
controller and plant is unchanged. The orig-
inal control objective is achieved although
performance may degrade.
 Reconguration change in input-output be-
tween the controller and plant through change
of controller structure and parameters. The
original control objective is achieved al-
though performance may degrade.
 Supervision the ability to monitor whether
control objectives are met. If not, calculate
a revised control objective and a new control
structure and parameters that make a faulty
closed loop system meet the new modied
objective. Supervision should take eect if
faults occur and it is not possible to meet the
original control objective within the fault-
tolerant scheme.
 Structure graph A directed graph represent-
ing the general dynamic equations (con-
straints) that describe the system. Con-
straints that are isomorphic mappings are
denoted by double arrows on arcs. Non-
isomorphic mappings are indicated by uni-
directional arcs in the graph. The graph has
the special property that it is bipartite.
2.2 Denitions
A standard control problem is dened by a control
objective O, a class of control laws U , and a set of
constraints C. Constraints are functional relations
that describe the behavior of a dynamic system.
Linear or nonlinear dierential equations consti-
tute very useful representations of constraints for
many physical systems. Other types of models are
necessary in other cases. The constraints dene
a structure S and parameters  of the system.
Solving the control problem means to nd in U a
control law U that satises C while achieving O .
Some performance indicator J could be associated
with a control objective O. When several solutions
exist, the best one is selected according to J . The
control problem is dened as:
Control : Solve the problem < O;S; ;U > where
the structure S and parameters  of the con-
straints C are distinguished.
Now suppose that we only know the set to which
the actual value belongs, e.g. due to time-varying
parameters or uncertainty, the control problem
is now to achieve O under constraints whose
structure is S and whose parameters belong to
a set . Two solution approaches can be dened:
robust control minimizes the discrepancy over 
of the achieved results, while adaptive control rst
estimates the "true" parameter
^
:
Robust control : Solve < O;S;;U > where 
stands for a set of possible  values.
Adaptive control : Solve < O;S;
^
;U > where
^
 2
 is estimated as part of the adaptation.
The next problem extension is < O;S;;U >
where S stand for a given set of constraint struc-
tures. Dene some deterministic automaton  ;
which shifts from one pair (S; ) 2 S   to
another one (hybrid control). The problem is to
achieve O under a sequence of constraints which
is dened by  . When O itself is decomposed
into a sequence of goals, the problem becomes
< O;S;;U > with   shifting from one quadruple
(O;S; ; U) 2 O  S  U to another.
If < O;S;;U > represents uncertain knowl-
edge about (S; ), O has to be achieved under
constraints whose structure and parameters are
partly unknown. Let objective O and a nominal
system (S

; 

) be given. Let (S; ) be the actual
constraints and (
^
S;
^
) the estimated ones. Nomi-
nal control solves < O;S

; 

;U >. When a fault
occurs, (S; ) 6= (S

; 

) and nominal control is
no longer suitable. This is a generalization of the
robust and adaptive control problems. Both the
parameters and the structure of constraints may
change when faults occur.
Fault-tolerant control : Solve < O;
^
S ;
^
;U >
where

^
S;
^


is the set of possible structures and
parameters of the faulty system. Where diagnosis
is available, the set

^
S;
^


could be provided by
a diagnosis task.
Many dierent approaches can be used to solve
the FTC problem < O;
^
S ;
^
;U > (Patton, 1997).
However, robust approaches, which achieve the
goal for any pair (S; ) are clearly unrealistic in
the general case.
We dene two subsets of fault-tolerant control,
one is accommodation, the other reconguration.
Fault accommodation: Solve the control problem
< O;
^
S;
^
;U > where (
^
S;
^
) is the estimate of the
actual constraints, e.g. provided by fault diagnosis
algorithms.
A fault can be accommodated if < O;
^
S;
^
;U >
has a solution. If accommodation is not possible,
another problem has to be stated, by nding a
pair (; ) among all feasible pairs S  ; such
that < O;; ;U > has a solution. A pair (; )
is considered feasible if it belongs to the fault-
free parts of the faulty system. Fault diagnosis
may identify a set

^
S ;
^


to give an estimate
of the constraints of the faulty system. This is
not a necessary prerequisite but the availability
of such estimate will improve the possibility of
nding said solution. This procedure is an active
approach, the control is changed as a consequence
of our knowledge of the new control problem. We
hence dene:
Reconguration: Find a new set of system con-
straints (; ) 2 (S;)



(
^
S ;
^
) such that the con-
trol problem < O;; ;U > has a solution. Ac-
tivate this solution. The choice of a new set of
constraints will imply that input-output relations
between controller and plant are changed.
The dierence between accommodation and re-
conguration whether input-output (I/O) be-
tween controller and plant is changed. Recon-
guration implies use of dierent I/O relations
between the controller and the system. Switch of
the system to a dierent internal structure, to
change its mode of operation, is an example of
such I/O switching. Accommodation does not use
such means.
Both fault accommodation and system recong-
uration strategies may need new control laws in
response to faults. They also have to manage tran-
sient behavior, which result from the change of
control law or change of the constraints' structure.
It is noted that the set of feasible pairs S  
may depend on the fault(s). If such a pair does
not exist, this means that O can be achieved
neither by fault accommodation nor by system
reconguration. The only possibility is thus to
change O.
The most general problem is dened by the triple
< O;S;;U > where O is a set of possible control
objectives. In view of its practical interpretation,
< O;S;;U > is dened as a supervision problem
in which the system goal is not pre-dened, but
has to be determined at each time taking into
account the actual system possibilities.
Supervision: Monitor the triple (O;S; ) to deter-
mine whether the control objective is achieved. If
this is not the case, and the fault tolerant problem
does not have a solution, then nd a relaxed
objective   2 O and a pair (; ) 2 S; such
that the relaxed control problem <  ;; ;U >
has a solution.
Supervision is thus an FTC problem associated
with a decision problem: when faults are such that
fault-tolerance cannot be achieved, the system
goal itself has to be changed. When far-reaching
decisions with respect to the system goal have
to be taken, human operators are generally in-
volved, using decision support from the diagno-
sis and overall goals for the plant (Lind, 1994),
(Staroswiecki and Gehin, 2000). It should be
noted that the choice of   could be made to
include the fail-to-safe condition where control is
no longer active but plant safety is not at stake.
Two further denitions are useful. Recoverable
system: A system is recoverable from a fault i
a solution exists to at least one of the problems
< O;
^
S;
^
;U > and < O;; ;U > .
Weakly recoverable: A system is weakly recover-
able if a solution exists to <  ;; ;U >.
3. ANALYSIS OF FAULT PROPAGATION
The rst step in a fault-tolerant design is to de-
termine which failure modes could severely aect
the safety or availability of a plant. Analysis of
failure of parts of a system is a classical discipline
and the failure mode and eects analysis (FMEA)
is widely used and appreciated in industry. The
traditional FMEA does not support analysis of
the handling of faults, only of their propagation.
In automated systems, when the goal of fault-
tolerance is to continue operation, if this is at
all possible. An extended method for fault prop-
agation analysis (FPA) was hence suggested in
(Blanke, 1996) using an algebraic approach for
propagation analysis. The aim of the FPA is to
show end eects of faults, and assist in designing
for fault tolerance such that end eects with severe
consequences are stopped if the system structure
makes this possible. If the FPA analysis nds that
serious eects can occur due to certain faults,
these are included in a list of fault eects to be
detected. Whether this is possible is disclosed in
a later analysis of structure that shows which
redundant information is available in the system
(Staroswiecki and Bayart, 1996), (Cocquempot et
al., Grenoble, France, July 1991, pp. 309-314),
(Cocquempot et al., 1998).
3.1 Fault propagation
For the reasons given above, fault analysis needs
to incorporate analysis throughout a system. In
order to do this a component-based method was
introduced (Blanke, 1996), in which possible com-
ponent faults are identied at an early stage of
design. The method uses the clasical FMEA de-
scription (Legg, 1978), (Herrin, 1981) of compo-
nents as a starting point. In this context compo-
nents are sensors, valves, motors, programmable
functions etc. Programmable parts are considered
as consisting of separate function blocks that can
be treated similarly to physical components in the
analysis, bearing in mind that their properties
may be changed by software modications if so
desired.
An FMEA scheme shows how fault eects out of
the component relate to faults at inputs, outputs,
or parts within the components.
Fault propagation matrix: boolean mapping of
component faults f
c
2 F onto eects e
c
2 E :
M : F  E y f0; 1g (1)
m
ij
=

1 if f
cj
= 1 =) e
ci
= 1
0 otherwise
(2)
An FMEA scheme can be expressed as
e
ci
 M
f
i

 f
ci
(3)
where M
f
i
is a Boolean matrix representing the
propagation. The operator 
 is the inner product
disjunction operator that performs the boolean
operation
e
cik
 (m
ik1
^ f
ci1
)_(m
ik2
^ f
ci2
) :::_(m
ikn
^ f
cin
)
(4)
System descriptions are obtained from intercon-
nection of component descriptions. Merging two
levels gives for example the end eects
e
c2
 
2
4
I 0
0

A
f
2



I 0
0 A
f
1

3
5



f
c2
f
c1

(5)
Eventually, end eects at the system level are
reached and a mapping of observed eects to pos-
sible faults are obtained through f
c
=
 
M
f

 1
e
c
:
And
 
M
f

 1
=M
T
since M
f
is Boolean. Anal-
ysis of the system matrix can easily show where
in the system the propagation should be detected
and stopped.
When there is no logical feedback involved, the
result is the capability of isolation of fault eects
at any level. If feedback is involved, we have
a principal diÆculty: if a cut in the graph of
a boolean loop is stable - the two sides of the
cut remain equal after one propagation around
the loop - then the loop is a tautology and can
be eliminated. If not, no boolean solution exists.
A "dedicated loop treatment" was employed in
(Blanke et al., 1999) to dene the two sides
of a loop cut as additional input and output,
and leave the further judgement to the designer.
This shortcoming is shared by several methods in
reliability engineering. The principal diÆculty is
caused by the binary modeling of faults and their
propagation.
With this obstacle in mind, fault propagation
analysis should be the rst step in a fault-tolerant
design. The systematic approach forced upon the
designer should not be underestimated, and might
even be an asset as an essential part of the safety
assessment needed in many industrial designs.
Experience from applying fault propagation anal-
ysis to larger systems show that we might need
to include occurrence of one fault and the non-
occurrence of another in the description (Bgh,
1997). This means extending f
i
to

f
i
;

f
i

T
in the
above expressions.
4. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
The structural model of a system, see (Staroswiecki
and Declerck, 1989) and (Declerck and Staroswiecki,
1991), is a directed graph that represents the
relations between system variables and param-
eters (known and unknown), and the dynamic
equations (constraints) that describe the system
behavior. Analysis of the system-structure graph
will reveal any system redundancy, and particular
sub-systems can be identied which can be ex-
ploited to obtain fault-tolerance.
4.1 Structural model
Let F = ff
1
; f
2
; ::f
m
g be the set of the con-
straints which represent the system model and
Z = fz
1
; z
2
; ::z
n
g the set of the variables and
parameters. With K the subset of the known
and X the subset of the unknown elements in
Z; Z = K [ X . Z is allowed to contain time
derivatives, so that dynamic systems as well as
static ones can be described by their structure.
Structure graph: The structure graph of a system
is a bipartite graph (F;Z;A) where elements in
the set of arcs A  F  Z are dened by :
(f
i
; z
j
) 2 A i the constraint f
i
applies to the
variable or parameter z
j
, ( f
i
2 F with i = 1; :::m
and z
j
2 Z with j = 1; :::n):
The structure-graph is bipartite (Henley and
Williams, 1973)) because its vertices can be sep-
arated into two disjoint sets F and Z in such a
way that every edge has one endpoint in F and
the other in Z.
Furhter, one can dene a sub-system as any subset
of the system constraints  along with the re-
lated variables Q() 2 Z: There are no specic
requirements to the choice of the elements in :
P(F ) is the set of the subsets of F and it contains
all possible sub-systems. The sub-graph that is
related to a sub-system is the structure of the sub-
system, (;Q()):
4.2 Matching on a structure-graph and canonical
decomposition
The set of constraints is separated in F
K
; those
that apply only to known variables, and F
X
,
which apply to unknown elements in Z, F = F
K
[
F
X
. We are interested in the analysis of the sub-
graph G(F
X
; X;A
X
) in order to determine which
analytic redundancy relations exist that can help
access a particular variable. If redundant sub-
graphs are available, then the particular variable
could be observed or controlled via the redundant
path if a constraint in the rst one is violated due
to a fault.
A matching M is a set of connections between
elements in X and F
x
. A complete matching on X
means: forallxinX 9f 2 F
X
such that (f; x) 2
M .
According to (Dulmage and Mendelsohn, 1958),
the bipartite graph can be decomposed into sub-
graphs, where the variables are associated with
constraints. When there is more than one possi-
bility for a complete matching on X , this shows
the redundancy of the system.
5. RECOVERABILITY
A fault is a discrete event that acts on a system
and by that changes some of the properties of
the system. The goal of fault-tolerant control is in
turn to respond to the occurrence of a fault such
that the faulty system still is well behaved. This is
achieved by accommodation of the fault or by re-
conguration. Due to these discrete nature of fault
occurrence and reconguration, FTC systems are
hybrid in nature. This is illustrated in gure 1
where 
f
denotes fault events, 
a
denotes control
events reconguring the system and q
c
denotes
the control mode which selects a control law. The
actual physical mode q
p
of the plant my be viewed
as the discrete state of an automaton which is
driven by plant internal events 
p
, the fault events

f
and the control events 
a
. It is noted that
sensors and actuators are considered belonging
to the plant. The interface betwen controller and
plant is hence at the signal level. The controller is
then purely the software method that implements
the control algorithm and the computer platform
with appropriate signal interface to materialise
the control function.
The analysis of the behavior of fault tolerant
control system is not trivial (Frei et al., 1999)
and later results by (Wu and Zhou, 2000). For
the design of fault tolerant control systems the
hybrid nature is usually neglected and the focus
lies with fault detector design and selection of
remedial action.
5.1 Quality Measures for Recovery
Whether a system can be recovered from a fault
or not is a question of properties inherent in the
( , , )
( , , )
p p p p
p p p
x f x q u
y h x q u



p
qp
 p
 f - fault a
y
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u
y
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

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( , , )
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
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Fig. 1. Fault tolerant control systems are hybrid
by nature. The dynamics of the plant is
inuenced by mode changes q
p
, the controller
by q
c
: 
f
denote fault events, 
a
control
events. Plant internal events are 
p
:
system. The extent to which the functionality of a
system can be recovered from a fault depends on
how much control and output information is still
available.
5.1.1. Quality indicators The reconguration
problem was dened as the solution of the con-
trol problem < O;; ;U > where (; ) 2

(S;)



(
^
S;
^
)

. The control problem is solved
by satisfying the control objective, often expressed
through an indicator J . Dierent structural alter-
natives can then be compared through the achiev-
able value of the indicator associated with the
particular structure,
J
x
(; ) = min
u2U
J(O;; ;U) (6)
If a limit J
a
exists for solutions to be admissible,
J = fJ
x
(; )jJ(; ) < J
a
g, then the cardinality
of J represents the number of admissible recong-
uration solutions, selected out of a possibly larger
set that has the necessary structural properties. In
model predictive control, the optimal J is found
and the associated controller selected for use after
fault diagnosis has provided an assessment of the
structure and parameters of the faulty system.
The calculation of J could be heavy since the com-
plete closed loop optimization problem is solved
for each of the possible recongurations. Measures
of the control energy needed to change a particular
state from one value to another could also be
useful, and simpler to calculate. A similar measure
of output observation could express the ease with
which measurements could be reconstructed. This
argumentation leads to the denition of a quality
measure for recovery using the underlying system
properties controllability and observability.
Consider a set of plants S(q
f
; q
a
) parameterized
by the congurators q
f
and q
a
(i.e. q
p
= (q
f
; q
a
).
This means S(?;?) represents the nominal fault
free system, S(q
f
;?) represents the system after
occurrence of the fault event and S(q
f
; q
a
) denotes
the faulty system after reconguration.
5.1.2. Measures based on Gramians Linear mea-
sures of quality require a linearized system de-
scription. Consider therefore the linear time in-
variant (faulty) system S(q
f
; q
a
) given by
_x(t) = A(q
f
; q
a
)x(t) +B(q
f
; q
a
)u(t)
y(t) = C(q
f
; q
a
)x(t) +D(q
f
; q
a
)u(t)
(7)
Let us more closely study sensor and actuator
faults. Determining the inuence of a missing
faulty sensor or actuator on the systems's oper-
ability is a question also studied in connection
with the selection of actuators and sensors see
e.g. (J. P. Keller, 1992)). While for the classi-
cal sensor/actuator selection problem the goal is
to identify and remove those of minor or nearly
identical inuence. Fault tolerant control aims at
retaining some of the redundant sensors and actu-
ators. (Muller and Weber, 1972) utilize measures
for the degree of observability. and controllability.
These measures may also be utilized to be an
indicator for the quality of the recoverability. The
measures of choice are the observability gramian
W
o
(S) =
Z
1
0
e
A
T
t
C
T
Ce
At
dt (8)
and similarly for the controllability
W
c
(S) =
Z
1
0
B
T
e
A
T
e
At
Bdt (9)
It is noted that these denitions require that
the system is stable. Gramians which allow to
identify direction in state space of dierent de-
gree of controllability and observability (assuming
an adequate non-dimensionalisation of the sys-
tem's states, inputs, and outputs). This means,
for some non-dimensionalised state x
0
, the quan-
tity x
T
0
W
o
x
0
represents the observation "energy"
obtained from this state. For any x, which is a
unit length eigenvector, the obtained observation
energy is determined by the corresponding eigen-
value. An unobservable direction provides zero
observation energy. The fact that the matrix de-
terminant combines information about all eigen-
values, motivates the following quality indicator
for measurement recovery

o
(q
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) =
n
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jW
o
(S(q
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; q
a
))j
jW
o
(S(?;?))j
(10)
where the n
th
root serves to make the measure
independent of the system dimension n. The rel-
ative measure of volume further helps on the de-
pendancy of the basis for A,B,C,D. A not-scaled
Gramian measure based on singular values is dis-
cussed in (Wu and Zhou, 2000).
Similar arguments lead to the denition
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n
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jW
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jW
c
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as a quality indicator for control recovery after an
actuator fault.
Both measures Eq.11 and Eq.10 assume that
S(?;?) is controllable and observable. If this is
not the case, the measure should be applied to
the observable or controllable subspaces, only.
The consequence of a zero measure of Eq.11 is
that a closed-loop observer can not be designed.
Nevertheless, an open-loop solution may still exist
for use as a short-term replacement signal for a
failed sensor (Blanke et al., 1995).
5.2 Combined Analysis
The above measures allow to assess a system's
recoverability for a specic situation. Especially
during the design phase of a FTC system a struc-
tural analysis (see also (Staroswiecki et al., 1999))
may help to nd suitable locations for redun-
dant sensors or actuators. Here too, we encounter
questions very closely related to question in the
design of control systems (see e.g. (Morari and
Stephanopoulos, 1980)).
The structure of a system (Eq.7) may be repre-
sented by a graph or a structural matrix (Lin,
1974). A system (A(q
f
; q
a
);B(q
f
; q
a
)) is struc-
turally controllable i (Glover and Silverman,
1976)
(1) each state node is accessible from at least one
control node
(2) the generic rank of the structural matrix
(A(q
f
; q
a
) B(q
f
; q
a
)) is n.
Determining structural observability is the dual
problem. A system is thus (structurally) recov-
erable if it remains structurally controllable and
structurally observable.
5.3 Consequences for FTC
A strategy which is sometimes considered as a
remedial action to a sensor fault is to reconstruct
the missing measurement, using this instead of
the original measurement with the existing control
law (T. Marcu, April 3-4, 1998) and (Blanke et
al., 1998). However, this might not always be pos-
sible. First, it must be possible to reconstruct the
missing measurement from the remaining mea-
surements. Otherwise, the strategy leads to open
loop control of certain modes, which could only
be a short time remedial action. A measurement
of a faulty sensor can be reconstructed from the
remaining measurements if and only if the system
is recoverable from that sensor fault. To show this,
consider the generalized eigenvector decomposi-
tion of the system and write:
y
i
(t) = c
i
x(t) = c
i
n
X
j=1

j
(t)q
j
=
n
X
j=1

j
(t)c
i
q
j
where y
i
is the measurement to be reconstructed,
q
j
are the eigenvector directions of the system,

j
(t) the time evolution along these directions and
n the dimension of the state space of the system.
To show that recoverability is suÆcient note that
all directions q
j
for which c
i
q
j
6= 0 contribute to
the measurement y
i
. If the system is recoverable
from the failure of sensor i these directions remain
observable and thus y
i
(t) can be reconstructed.
On the other hand: If the system is not recov-
erable it looses observability (sensor fault). The
direction(s) q
j
for which observability is lost was
observable in combination with sensor i and thus
c
i
q
j
6= 0. That is the unobservable direction q
j
would be needed to reconstruct the output y
i
.
This basically means that there are directions
that are only observable in combination with the
output y
i
and therefore can not be reconstructed
if y
i
is missing.
6. AUTONOMOUS SUPERVISION
Autonomous supervision requires development
and implementation observing completeness and
correctness qualities. It is important that the de-
sign of a supervised control system follows a mod-
ular approach, where each functionality can be
designed, implemented, and tested independently
of the remaining system. The algorithms that real-
ize the supervisory functionality constitute them-
selves an increased risk for failures in software,
so the overall reliability can only be improved
if the supervisory level is absolutely trustworthy.
General design principles were treated in (Blanke
et al., 1997), development methods were improved
and an implementation demonstrated in a satellite
application in (Bgh, 1997). A seven-step design
procedure was shown to lead to an signicantly
improved logic design compared to what was ob-
tainable by conventional ad-hoc methods. The
design of the autonomous supervisor was the sub-
ject in (Izadi-Zamanabadi, 1999) where the COSY
ship propulsion benchmark was the main example
(Izadi-Zamanabadi and Blanke, 1999). A software
architecture for fault-tolerant process control was
suggested in (Lunau, 1997).
The experience from the above studies was that
design of an autonomous supervisor relies heavily
Plant wide control
State info
& alarms
Detections
Autonomous Supervisor
Commands &
setpoints
Actions
Effectors Detectors
Setpoints
Intell. sensors
Filtering &
validity check
Control
algorithm
Actuator
Control Level
Simple sensors
Fig. 2. Autonomous supervisor comprises fault
diagnosis, supervisor locic and eectors, the
latter to cary out the necessary remedial ac-
tions when faults are diagnosed. The upper
level is plant-wide control and operator su-
pervision.
on having an appropriate architecture that sup-
ports clear allocation of methods to dierent soft-
ware tasks. This is crucial for both development
and verication. The latter is vital since test of
the supervisor functions in an autonomous control
system is a daunting task.
6.1 Architecture
The implementation of a supervisory level onto
a control system is not trivial. The architecture
shall implement
 Support overall plant control in dierent
phases of the controlled process; start-up,
normal operation, batch processing, event
triggered operation, close-down.
 Support of all control modes for normal op-
eration and modes of operation with foresee-
able faults.
 Autonomous monitoring of operational sta-
tus, control errors, process status and condi-
tions.
 Autonomous fault diagnosis, accommodation
and reconguration. Information status to
plant-wide coordinated control.
These functions are adequately implemented in
a supervisory structure with two levels in the
autonomous controller, and communication to a
plant-wide control as the third. The autonomous
supervision is composed of level 2 and taking care
of fault diagnosis, logic for state control and ef-
fectors for activation or calculation of appropriate
remedial actions. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
The control level is designed and tested in each
individual mode that is specied by dierent oper-
ational phases and dierent instrumentation con-
gurations. The miscellaneous controller modes
are considered separately and it is left to the
supervisor design to guarantee selection of the
correct mode in dierent situations.
The detectors are signal processing units that
observe the system and compares with the ex-
pected system behavior. An alarm is raised when
an anomaly is detected. The Eectors execute the
remedial actions associated with fault accommo-
dation or reconguration.
6.2 Design Procedure
When the level of autonomy becomes high and
thereby demands a higher level of reliable op-
eration, it becomes inherently more complex for
the designer to cover all possible situations and
guarantee correct and complete operation (Misra,
1994), (Bgh, 1997).
A systematic design strategy will use the analysis
of fault propagation and structure as basic ele-
ments:
(1) Fault propagation: A Fault Propagation Anal-
ysis of all relevant sub-systems is performed
and combined into a complete analysis of the
controlled system.
(2) Severity assessment : The top level end-
eects are judged for severity. The ones with
signicant inuence on performance, safety
or availability are selected for treatment by
the autonomous supervisor. A reverse deduc-
tion of the fault propagation is performed to
locate the faults that cause severe end-eects.
This gives a short-list of faults that should be
detected.
(3) Structural analysis : System structure is anal-
ysed for each of the short-listed faults from
step 2. The graph method gives a "yes-no"
type of information whether suÆcient redun-
dancy is available in the system to detect
each of the selected faults.
(4) Possibilities for FTC : The possibilities to ob-
tain fault-tolerance are considered. For each
of the short-listed faults, this means utilize
physical redundancy, then analytical redun-
dancy. Use the measures of recovery quality
in listing the most promising candidates for
accommodation or recovery.
(5) Select remedial actions : The possibilities in
4 are further elaborated. Look into enabling
and disabling redundant units, select among
possible accommodation or reconguration
actions. If the original control objectives can
not be met, handling of the problem by a the
supervision function must be considered. The
autonomous part of supervision must always
be to oer graceful degradation and close
down when this is necessary as fall-back.
The remedial actions determine the require-
ments for fault isolation. It is not necessary to
isolate faults below the level where the fault
eect propagation can be stopped. When re-
conguration is needed, and complete isola-
tion can not be achieved within the required
time to recongure, the set (; ) will need to
be selected assuming a worst-case condition
among the set f
^
S;
^
g; the available output
from the fault diagnosis. The worst case fault
is one that has the highest degree of severity.
(6) Design of remedial actions: Actions are de-
signed to achieve the required fault-tolerance,
e.g. change control level algorithms or enable
redundant hardware. Controller redesign can
be required.
(7) Fault diagnosis design: The structure infor-
mation again provides a list of possibilities.
The recongurability measure for the faulty
system indicates how diÆcult reconstruction
will be.
(8) Supervisor logic: Supervisor inference rules
are designed using the information about
which faults/eects are detected and how
they are treated. The autonomous supervisor
determines the most appropriate action from
the present condition and commands. The
autonomous supervisor must be designed to
treat mode changes of the controlled process
and any overall/operator commands. Worst-
case conditions and overall safety objectives
should have priority when full isolation or
controller-redesign can not be accomplished
within the required time to get within control
specications after a fault.
(9) Test : Should be complete. The main obstacle
is the complexity of the resulting hybrid sys-
tem consisting of controller and plant. Tran-
sient conditions should be carefully tested.
These steps are followed to make the supervisor
design. The fault coverage can be considered com-
plete to the extent the FPA includes all possible
faults. The strategy oers that the system is an-
alyzed on a logical level as far as possible before
the laborious job of mathematical modelling and
design is initiated.
7. AN EXAMPLE: SHIP PROPULSION
To illustrate the methods of analysis, we consider
a ship propulsion system , which was dened as
a COSY benchmark on fault detection and fault-
tolerant control (Izadi-Zamanabadi and Blanke,
1999), (Izadi-Zamanabadi, 1999).
This example considers a subset of the benchmark
to illustrate selected parts of the overall analysis.
7.1 Constraints
Developed thrust and torque are functions of pitch
u
2
, shaft speed x
1
and ship speed x
2
.
Measurements are
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Diesel engine and dynamic shaft equation
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Ship speed and hull resistance,
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The dierentials _x
1
and _x
2
are the integrals of
x
1
and x
2
, respectively. Since integration of the
derivative can not determine the related state
variable, due to unknown initial value, the arrows
in the structure diagram are unidirectional.
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This illustrates the dierence between observabil-
ity and calculability, as dened in structure anal-
ysis. Finally, parameters are assumed known. All
such parameters should have identity constraints
associated with them. For brevity, only two are
shown in the Figure,
f
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The control objective is to obtain desired ship
speed while meeting constraints on the shaft's
angular speed. The system's structure graph is
shown in Figure 7.1
The ship benchmark deals with several faults. One
of those is a sensor fault in shaft speed measure-
ment. This means constraint f
1
is violated. This
example investigates which redundancy relations
exist to reconstruct this measurement.
7.2 Analysis of Structure
We rst observe which variables belong to the
sets F (15 elements), X(12 elements) and K(7
elements):
F = ff
1
; f
2
:::f
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g (18)
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Fig. 3. The system-structure graph for the ship
propulsion example. Constraints are func-
tional relations between parameters and vari-
ables.
X-element M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4
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Table 1. Four examples on complete
matching on X for the example
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A structural analysis of the system gives that the
set A could be ordered as one matrix of dimension
(dim(F ); (dim(X) + dim(K))).
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Several complete matchings on X exist, some of
which are listed in table 1. In the table, the
elements refer to the constraints (as elements in
A) that are associated with each variable in X .
In match 1, x
1
is associated with f
1
whereas it is
associated with f
8
in matching number 2.
In the non-faulty case, x
1
is assessed through
measurement, formally through constraint 1 and
the arc (f
1
; x
1
; (f
1
; y
1
)). If the fault in f
1
occurs,
analytic redundancy relations should be found
that reconstruct x
1
from other relations. This is
possible from matchings 2, 3 or 4, which do not in-
clude f
1
: In constructing the analytic redundancy
relations, one has to consider the causality, it is
not possible to calculate x
1
from _x
1
through f
12
as listed in matching 3, since the initial value at
the start of calculation is unknown.
Observer techniques could, nevertheless, be em-
ployed to provide a useful - and asymptotically
correct - estimate, if observation was started well
in advance of the fault incident.
The conclusion is that in the faulty case, we could
use two remaining ARRs, one uses constraint f
8
,
the other f
9
.
8. SUMMARY
This paper has introduced fault-tolerant control
as a new discipline within automatic control. The
objective was to increase plant availability and re-
duce the risk of safety hazards when faults occur.
Concise denitions were given to cover the hier-
archy from fault-tolerant control to supervision,
with the remedial actions to faults being dened
as accommodation and reconguration depending
on the degree of redundancy in the controlled pro-
cess. Principal analysis of essential system prop-
erties were treated, the topics were selected to
give the essence of an overall fault tolerant design.
These included fault propagation analysis, struc-
tural analysis and selection of the best remedial
actions based on measures of recovery for a system
when a particular fault occurs. An example from
a ship propulsion benchmark was used to show
salient features of dierent parts of the design.
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